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Predictability and China’s Legally Binding Goal of CO2 Emissions in The Copenhagen
Negotiation
Yuan Xu1
Abstract
Two facts define China’s status in the global efforts of CO2 mitigation: China has overtaken
the United States as the world’s largest CO2 emitter. And as a developing country with low
per capita emissions, China will grow into a much bigger one. Accordingly, in the coming
Copenhagen negotiation, whether China will accept a legally binding goal is of great
importance. China’s CO2 emissions in the past three decades are analyzed in this paper to
distinguish two prominent features: abrupt changes and cycles. Abrupt changes break the past
trend and make projections into the future unreliable. China has experienced two abrupt
changes of CO2 emissions since 1998 – one downward and one upward. A likely future one
will seriously compromise the application of an absolute CO2 goal to China. On the other
hand, stable cycles characterized China’s CO2 emissions, but the 10-yr period does not
overlap with the 5-yr commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Intensity goals can much
better address these two concerns. A future abrupt change of baseline CO2 emissions intensity
is less likely and no cycles are apparent. China has adopted intensity goals in its domestic
efforts of energy conservation and environmental protection. A CO2 emissions intensity goal
is also being considered, which indicates that intensity goals could have a better chance in
persuading China to negotiate a legally binding goal in the Copenhagen negotiation.
1. Introduction
China did not get a legally binding goal in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. With rapid economic
growth, China’s share in the world’s total CO2 emissions has risen from 10.6% in 1990 to
20.6% in 2006.2 China’s future will be even more important than its present status: during
2005-2030, China’s incremental energy-related CO2 emissions could be responsible for over
two fifth of the world’s. 3 Upon the negotiation in Copenhagen for a post-Kyoto CO2
mitigation regime, how to effectively incorporate China becomes one of the most critical
factors that will decide the success of the negotiation and subsequent implementation.
Intensity goals have long been suggested to accommodate economic growth
especially in developing countries and induce them to accept legally binding goals.4 Under a
cap-and-trade scheme, intensity goals can also reduce the uncertainty of CO2 permit price.5
However, the merits of intensity goals were generally discussed among many countries with
less attention to a specific country, particularly China with rapidly growing importance and
some distinct features of uncertainty. Accordingly, for China in the coming Copenhagen
negotiation, intensity goals may not have been fully appreciated.
This paper analyzes in detail China’s CO2 emissions in the past three decades and
especially since 1998 to compare intensity and absolute goals. Predictability is the focused
perspective. Section 2 addresses two abrupt changes associated with China’s CO2 emission
since 1998. Section 3 further analyzes the consequence of the abrupt changes on projecting
China’s CO2 emissions. Intensity goals are compared with absolute goals facing the
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uncertainty of a future abrupt change. Section 4 studies the clear cycles expressed in the
annual growth rates of China’s CO2 emissions. Section 5 introduces the application of
intensity goals in China. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Abrupt Changes of China’s CO2 Emissions
A key issue in goal setting is to forecast baseline emissions in the year intended for goal
attainment. Goals can be constructed around the baseline plus some designated reduction
efforts. Obviously, goals are for the future and the baseline is estimated ex ante. However,
due to the inherent uncertainty in predicting the future, the ex ante baseline may differ greatly
from the ex post one analyzed afterwards without much of the proceeding uncertainty. If the
ex post baseline is much lower than the goal, a problem of “hot air” will be created. In the
scenario, China will have many extra CO2 permits to sell and considering China’s huge size,
the oversupply of CO2 permits could lead to the collapse of international CO2 prices and
undermine effective CO2 mitigation. On the other hand, if the ex post baseline is much higher
than the goal, China will either resort to methods with high mitigation costs or purchase CO2
permits in the international market. The excessive financial burden will trouble not only
China, but also other countries that plan to purchase CO2 permits at a lower price. The
investment from the business world on CO2 mitigation can also be hampered facing a
significantly uncertain future CO2 price. In short, because of China’s large and rapidly
growing share in the world’s CO2 emissions, its uncertainty can greatly affect the world.
China has clearly demonstrated its potential of making surprises in CO2 emissions. An
effective negotiation in Copenhagen requires an acceptable way to China to address the
uncertainty if a legally binding goal is wanted from China. The Kyoto Protocol was
negotiated in 1997, more than a decade before its commitment period starting in 2008. A
short interval as it is for many countries, China experienced abrupt changes at both directions
of CO2 emissions change (Fig. 1). If a new treaty for 2013 and beyond is successfully
negotiated in Copenhagen, the interval will be three years. But even three years can be long
enough for China to witness unexpected changes of CO2 emissions. Not only a goal for China
will be difficult to negotiate under the huge uncertainty, but also China’s willingness to start
negotiation could be compromised. Facing particularly the surprisingly high growth of CO2
emissions since 2002 (Fig. 1) and serious problems in environmental policy implementation,
China may not be confident to achieve a legally binding goal of CO2 emissions, and thus not
willing to negotiate one.
China’s CO2 emissions in the past decade looked like riding a roller coaster – coming
down and going up at dazzling speeds that surprised both the world and China itself. In the
three years from 1998 to 2000, though the economic growth rates were slower than the
average since 1980, China’s economy still expanded 25.7%.6 The CO2 emissions, however,
shrank by 5.3%.7 It was out of the world’s expectation: for example, in the reference scenario
of the International Energy Outlook 1998, EIA (Energy Information Administration)
projected that China would emit 3,586 Tg of CO2 in 2000,8 but the actual emissions were
2.967 Tg9, 17.3% lower than the value projected only two years in advance. In the subsequent
years, China surprised the world again but in another direction. China’s CO2 emissions in
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2006 were 103% higher than those in 2000 to reach 6,018 Tg10, surpassing the reference
scenario’s expectation in the International Energy Outlook 2004 for the year of 2020 – 5,693
Tg.11
China was not less surprised. Though China did not make official projection on its
CO2 emissions, its goal of SO2 emissions could act as a surrogate. For the 9th Five-Year Plan
(1996-2000), China established a goal to control its SO2 emissions in 2000 within 3.8%
above those in 1995.12 But the actual SO2 emissions went down by 16%.13 China’s ambition
for the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) grew into a 10% reduction goal of SO2 emissions14,
but the actual emissions in 2005 exceeded by 28% of those in 2000.15 Because China did not
start large deployment of SO2 scrubbers – a crucial technology to reduce SO2 emissions at
large point sources – until the 11th Five-Year Plan,16 the goals for the 9th and 10th Five-Year
Plans could partly reflect the corresponding baseline emission scenarios plus certain
reduction efforts. Clearly, the evolution of China’s SO2 emissions went out of the expectation
of China itself. Because of the close relationship between SO2 and CO2 emissions due to their
common major sources in coal consumption, it is fair to say that China was surprised by its
CO2 emissions.
In other words, China experienced two abrupt changes in the past decade alone, and
the most difficult part of prediction is abrupt changes. Neither the international institutions
nor China itself foresaw the trend.
The abrupt change is even more obvious in comparison with other countries (Fig. 1). If
the trend during 1980 – 1997 remained unchanged, China’s CO2 emissions would still
significantly trail the U.S.’ in 2006. The unexpected lower growth during 1998 – 2001
delayed China by about three to four years to catch up with the EU-15 (Fig. 1). But the later
surprising comeback made China surpass the United States by at least a decade earlier (Fig.
1).
3. Projection of China’s CO2 Emissions
With active efforts in energy conservation, China has already reversed the increasing trend of
energy intensity and achieved 10.1% reduction during 2006-2008. 17 CO2 intensity should
follow a similar trend. To project China’s future baseline emissions, serious questions will
be: whether another abrupt change is coming and whether China’s CO2 emissions trend can
stabilize again? Or whether we can design a goal for China with a fairly good knowledge of
its uncertainty?
Before approaching the questions, an analysis on the past projections is valuable.
World Energy Outlook (WEO) of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and International
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Energy Outlook (IEO) of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) make annual
projection of CO2 emissions for the world and major countries. The reference scenarios can
be viewed as a projection following the present policy and technology path, as a result, the
baseline emissions.
An immediate characteristic of Fig. 2 is that EIA and IEA’s projections for the year of
2020 receive close influence from the trends proceeding the baseline years. For example, in
WEO 2002 with the baseline year of 2000, IEA projected China’s CO2 emissions to reach
5,393 Tg in 2020 (Fig. 2). The equivalent growth rate in every five years would be 15.3%,
corresponding to the actual 2.2% increase during 1996-2000. WEO 2008 changed the
baseline year to 2006, which witnessed 93.6% growth of CO2 emissions in the proceeding
five years. Accordingly, the equivalent growth rate from the baseline year to 2020 was
adjusted upward to 22.7% per five years. Furthermore, the more meaningful impact seen in
Fig. 2 for designing China’s future goal is the projected CO2 emissions in 2020, which was
85% higher in WEO 2008 than that in WEO 2002. As a comparison, the difference of the two
projected China’s emissions for 2020 is equivalent to about 16% of the world’s emissions in
2006 – 29,195 Tg.18 EIA’s projections had essentially the same impression. It is not difficult
to imagine that China’s CO2 emissions goal for 2020 would differ much if it were negotiated
in 2002 instead of 2008.
Another message from Fig. 2 is that neither the pleasing low nor the worrying high
growth of CO2 emissions respectively proceeding the years of 2000 and 2006 were believed
to be sustainable. Instead, intermediate growth rates were taken. As illustrated above, though
the growth rates went up sharply by 91.4% (from 2.2% to 93.6%) comparing the 5-yr periods
ending in 2000 and 2006, the projected rates only increased by 7.3% (from 15.3% to 22.7%).
Then the projection indicates another abrupt change somewhere in the near future to greatly
decelerate China’s recent rapid growth close to the 5-yr growth rate during 1981-1997 –
25.2%.19 Such abrupt change is probable from the experience of Japan. During 1960-1973,
Japan had a comparable growth of CO2 emissions (Fig. 3) to China’s during 2002-2006 (Fig.
4). Their CO2 emissions intensity both went up (Fig. 3 & 4). Afterwards, Japan witnessed an
abrupt change and its CO2 emissions almost stabilized in absolute terms (Fig. 3).
If the coming of such an abrupt change is of less doubt, when and at what stabilized
growth rates will be of great uncertainty. China could have been fundamentally changed and
the past growth rates lost their value of reference. Even though China is working hard in
energy conservation, a significantly faster baseline emission trend might still be unavoidable
in the near future than that during 1980-1997. In another scenario, China could resemble
Japan’s path since 1990s (Fig. 3) and further decouple the growth of GDP and CO2
emissions.
Intensity goals are a better choice facing abrupt changes like China’s. CO2 emissions
intensity also had an abrupt change in 2002 from a continuous decrease to an increase
inexperienced since 1980 (Fig. 4). But the abrupt change of CO2 emissions during 1998-2001
was barely seen (Fig. 4). Furthermore, though we may also witness another abrupt change of
CO2 emissions intensity in the future, the uncertainty of its stabilized rates will be much
smaller than that for CO2 emissions, as demonstrated in Japan’s case (Fig. 3). To recognize
China’s active efforts in energy conservation and renewable energies in the past several
years, a baseline growth rate of 0% is a legitimate assumption for its CO2 emissions intensity.
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4. Cycles of China’s CO2 Emissions
Even if only considering the variability of China’s CO2 emissions over years, the goal
scheme in the Kyoto Protocol is not appropriate. As displayed in Fig. 4, China’s economy
and CO2 emissions have clear cycles. Even the two abrupt changes of CO2 emissions did not
break the 10-yr cycle period. Though the commitment period in the Kyoto Protocol (20082013) will likely fall into the decreasing branch of a cycle, a serious probability exists that the
commitment period could lie on the peak or the trough of a cycle, which would present
different baselines. If a negotiation on China’s goal still focuses on CO2 emissions, the stable
cycle and its greater magnitude will disable the commitment period of five years. In order to
smooth the peak and trough of a cycle, the commitment period should be last 10 years.
Additional mechanism like “banking” can leave the optimization decision to China on
allocating emission quota over those years.
In contrast, CO2 emissions intensity did not show any significant cycle (Fig. 4). Such
smoother change over years could facilitate the design of China’s goal and the length of a
commitment could be more flexible.
5. China’s Application of Intensity Goals
Goals are important tools for the Chinese central government to communicate and implement
its policies throughout the governmental system and the Chinese society. Five-Year Plans lie
in the central stage. In the area of energy and the environment, both intensity goals and
absolute goals have been applied.
In the National 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), China enacted an intensity goal on
energy conservation to reduce energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP) by
20%.20 The background was the increasing energy intensity during 2003-2005,21 a brand-new
experience for the Chinese government since the economic reform started. In the context, an
intensity goal was favored to seriously work for energy conservation while not worrying too
much about the uncertainty of economic growth.
Two goals on pollutant emissions also entered the National 11th Five-Year Plan: 10%
reduction of SO2 and COD (Chemical Oxygen Demand) emissions.22 Though expressed in
relative terms, these are absolute goals: as long as the emission levels in the anchor year
(2005) are determined, an emission cap for the attainment year (2010) will be clearly defined.
A similar goal of SO2 emissions was also established for the 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans23.
However, China’s energy consumption growth decelerated in the 9th Five-Year Plan and
accelerated in the 10th, which almost single-handedly decided the fates of the goals: a great
success in the 9th and a colossal failure in the 10th. The history should have taught the Chinese
government an important lesson in goal setting facing vast uncertainty.
On the other hand, in the 11th Five-Year Plan, the reduction of SO2 emissions in the
power sector follows an intensity goal based on grams of SO2 emissions per kWh of
electricity generated from coal power plants. China planned to bring down the intensity from
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6.4 grams/kWh in 2005 to 2.7 grams/kWh in 201024. It disclosed the necessary ambition to
achieve the 10% reduction of overall SO2 emissions.
Though China has not yet declared any national goal on CO2 emissions, a strong
preference to intensity goals have been expressed. In a recent report, the Chinese Academy of
Sciences – a key think tank for the Chinese government – advocated reducing China’s CO2
intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) by 50% in 2020 from the level in 2005. 25
According to the former chairman of the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee
of the National People’s Congress, China is officially considering a CO2 intensity goal in the
12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015).26
To sum up, China has been educated the disadvantages of absolute goals. Intensity
goals are gaining ground in energy conservation and CO2 emissions.
6. Conclusion
China and the world are heading toward negotiating a new climate treaty in Copenhagen in
the end of 2009. However, China’s role has not been very clear, particularly between
following the Kyoto Protocol without a legally binding goal and joining the industrialized
countries to negotiate one. As the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, China’s
attitude and deed can greatly boost or compromise the success of the new treaty.
Though intensity goals have been suggested to better involve developing countries
and accommodate economic growth, China’s specific and somewhat uncommon
characteristics have not been analyzed in detail to appreciate intensity goals more. This paper
mainly focuses on the importance of predictability in designing a CO2 goal, particularly
concerning abrupt changes and cycles.
Abrupt changes make China’s CO2 emission unpredictable. Since 1998, China has
experienced two abrupt changes. The first one was during 1998-2001 when the trend of CO2
emissions bent downward significantly. Two important institutions – EIA and IEA – had their
projected emissions seriously higher than the actual values. The second abrupt change was
more worrying for the world, which led China’s CO2 emissions to almost double during
2002-2006. The projections had to be adjusted upward every year by a large margin to
recognize the surge. Furthermore, because the growth rate of nearly doubling per five years is
hardly sustainable, a slow-down or probably another abrupt change is expected. But when
and at what level are unknown.
On the other hand, China’s CO2 emissions have the annual growth rates follow pretty
stable cycles with the period of about 10 years. Though the magnitude was getting stronger in
the recent decade, the periods can roughly represent a predictable part of China’s CO2
emissions.
Absolute goals behave very poorly facing abrupt changes, which raises significant
concern over an expected one in the future. Abrupt changes can cause problems of “hot air”
when actual CO2 emissions are unexpectedly low, and excessive demand of CO2 permits
when CO2 emissions are unexpectedly high. The five-year commitment period in the Kyoto
Protocol added more risk to China because it does not overlap with China’s stable cycles.
Both factors suggest that the goal scheme in the Kyoto Protocol should not be followed for
China.
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Intensity goals can much better address the two factors. An abrupt change of CO2
emissions growth rates in the future is less likely to sway CO2 emissions intensity
significantly away from its trend. This paper recommends adopting a 0% change as the
baseline to design China’s intensity goals. In addition, China’s CO2 emissions intensity did
not display any notable cycles in the annual change rates. No restriction, as a result, is
necessary to synchronize the length of a commitment period with the cycles.
China experienced great uncertainty in its SO2 emissions goals in the 9th and 10th
Five-Year Plans. Such uncertainty discouraged real efforts of pollutant mitigation. In the 11th
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), China has adopted intensity goals domestically in energy
conservation. SO2 emissions control in the power sector also applied another type of intensity
goals based on electricity generated. A CO2 intensity goal is incubating in China too, which
could be written into the 12th Five-Year Plan. All these makes a legally binding goal built on
CO2 emissions intensity more acceptable to China in the Copenhagen negotiation.
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